Despite the all the brinkmanship and the worries that things may go wrong, the talks between the Government of India and the NSCN(IM) continues to hold. Sadly though, the NSCN`™s other major faction, the NSCN(K) led by SS Khaplang, has walked away from its own ceasefire agreement with the Government of India. Khaplang`™s NSCN however continues to be in a peace agreement with the Myanmar Government. As also widely speculated, his organisation is set for yet another split, roughly along the international border that divides India and Myanmar. He will be at the head of the faction that has support base on the Myanmar side of the border and NSCN(K) leaders from the Indian side of the border, the other. There was always an inevitability about this split, after all, how exactly was the Government of India to reach a negotiated settlement with rebels who were technically Myanmar citizens, just as it could also well be asked, how exactly was the Myanmar government to reach an agreement with rebels who were technically Indian citizens. In many ways, Khaplang`™s abrogation of the ceasefire agreement was a confirmation and admission of a status quo that revolutionary rhetoric could not move, and therefore nothing too much to worry for the governments of India and Myanmar, despite all the hypes by the media. This was quite clearly indicated by the Government of India`™s response of extending its ceasefire with the NSCN(K) unilaterally. The gesture almost seemed like a warm send off. With Khaplang retreating to his base in Myanmar, the NSCN(K) base on the Indian side would have become marginalised and manageable for the government of India, leaving it to focus its attention entirely on the NSCN(IM) which has a dominant presence on the Indian side of the border, and therefore a much bigger problem from its point of view.
However, the NSCN(IM) problem is not going to offer easy solutions either. Besides the known oppositions to one of its main campaign plank of a united homeland for the Nagas, there are other formidable problems ahead. As for instance, even if this united homeland were to be agreed upon, if this arrangement is to be within the Union of India, which now obviously it will have to be, besides opposition from neighbouring states, there will be myriad internal dissentions on matters of competition for resources under the Government of India`™s dispensation. Government jobs, education quotas etc, would be just some of these. It is a fact that there is a strong lobby within Nagaland which is interested in consolidating Nagaland rather than dilute its core interests by incorporating more people within it. What works as idealistic slogans, often does not when it comes to putting them into actual practice. Moreover, the uneasy question before any settlement plan would be, if this settlement is not anything radically different from what was offered by the Shillong Accord of 1975, why had the Naga agony been prolonged so unnecessary when it could have been put to rest in 1975. Forty more years of blood and tear would have to be accounted for by something substantially more for the Nagas in general and not just those in the extra territory to be acquired. Unfortunately, for the moment, greater Nagaland seems so much like a Manipur problem than a Nagaland problem, and if the forty extra years of bloodshed comes to be for a solution of a Manipur problem, it is only to be expected that many eyebrows in Nagaland would be raised. The NSCN(IM) leadership surely must be realizing this and that that the longer the stagnation remains, the deeper its problems would become. In fact, it may already be in a deep crisis. The matter is getting palpably urgent with the BJP government at the Centre, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, keen to have the matter resolved once and for all without further delay. In tricky situation like this, sometimes it is doubtful if pushing for a quick solution is the solution at all. Quite paradoxically, and unenviable though it may be, a ceasefire that continues on might have already begun to appear as the best solution. At least overt hostilities would be avoided, just as has been the case for the last nearly 18 years in the case of the Nagas.
Leader Writer: Pradip Phanjoubam