Some of the news analyses of the events that preceded the busting of ULFA camps in Bhutan territory a decade ago make much more meaning for us when read against the Manipur situation today. When the Bhutan operation happened, it was known for a long time that Bhutan wanted to rid of its southern territories adjoining the Manas Wildlife Sanctuary in Assam, of the militants but were simply unable to have its will with its minuscule 6000 strong Army. Bhutan could have invited the Indian Army to intervene earlier as it did ultimately, for it was also known India for obvious reasons wanted these camps destroyed as much as Bhutan did. Bhutan’s dilemma was, as was spelled out by analysts at the time, it was easy to invite the Indian Army to do the job for them, but what it dreaded was how it was to have the same Army move out of its territory after the militants have been removed. This pound of flesh, Bhutan was unwilling to pay, and we are told this was what delayed the operations against the militant camps for years. It may be recalled, when finally the operation was agreed upon, it was to be Bhutan’s own Army that went against the militants, but with logistic covers from the Indian Army. Bhutan did not allow the Indian Army to directly intervene. No journalist were allowed to have a ringside view of the operations, as American embedded journalists had of the Iraq war, so there were no first hand reports on the nature of the battles. But it was known that Indian Army convoys made a beeline to Bhutan during the operations, supplying truckloads of ammunition and other ordnances. Helicopter support was also provided, according to some reports. In the end, Bhutan had its way and its southern territories were cleared of Indian militants without directly involving the Indian Army, and India too had what it wanted by clearing a territory which had literally become a “liberated zone” from where UGs of various hues could conduct their campaigns unchallenged.
Our attention however is on the dilemma that immobilized Bhutan for more than a decade. Although in a much different context and environment, we every now and then see similar dilemmas in the civil protest over the moves to set up a base for security forces in the vicinity of various villages. In the same way that Bhutan was unable to decide whether to call in the Indian Army to get rid of the Indian UGs, villages in Manipur too are afraid of an ever increasing trend of militarization of civil spaces. Manipur obviously wants a lasting resolution to its most vexing problems that have led to militancy, but in doing so, it too does not want to pay with the “pound of flesh” in the shape of a total militarization of its civil domains. In the long run, this will not be good for the civil population, as much as it will have no benefit for the security establishment. Of course we do not necessarily mean only the government forces when we say military, for the underground forces are also very much military in every sense of the word. It is surprising that the military, or the other militaristic organizations, have not realized as yet that no civilian feel comfortable in their presence. The protests by villagers every now and then, hence are hardly likely to be orchestration of militants, or a show of overt loyalty to the nation, as many so eagerly jump to the conclusion.
The suffocation of this militarization process is palpable in the state already. Practically all government tourist homes and lodges have already been converted to military or para-military camps and places outside the area of control of these camps have become the turfs of various underground forces. The result is, you do not even feel safe taking your family out for the perfectly legitimate pastime as an occasional picnic. Even if you do not feel any direct physical threats, the loss of privacy has robbed a greater part of the thrill of these outings. It is practically the same in every other sphere of life in Manipur, for the Bhutan dilemma has become virtually omnipresent here. How would Manipur’s civil spaces ever become rid of these men of war, state and non-state, is a question on every concerned citizen’s mind, but one which has depressingly failed a convincing articulation for all the while.